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Williams v. Superior Court, 
Freedom Newspapers, Inc., 
Real Party in Interest, 
5 Cal. 4th 337, 93 D.A.R. 7114, 
No. S022639 (June 7, 1993). 
Statutory Exemption From Public 
Disclosure for Law Enforcement 
Investigatory Files is 
Strictly Construed 
In this proceeding, the California Su-
preme Court interpreted the California 
Public Records Act, Government Code 
section 6250 et seq.; the particular provi-
sion at issue, Government Code section 
6254(f), exempts law enforcement inves-
tigatory files from the Act's general re-
quirement of public disclosure. The under-
lying dispute arose out of a newspaper's 
request for access to a county sheriff's re-
cords of disciplinary proceedings against 
two deputies. The disciplinary proceed-
ings arose out of two separate investiga-
tions of the deputies' conduct-an admin-
istrative investigation and a criminal in-
vestigation. Among other things, the she-
riff refused the request by asserting that 
the requested criminal investigation re-
cords were expressly exempt from disclo-
sure under section 6254(f). Eventually, the 
matter reached the Fourth District Court 
of Appeal, which, in attempting to set stan-
dards for determining whether particular 
records would be exempt from disclosure, 
articulated two limitations on the section 
6254(f) exemption that do not appear on 
the face of the statute. [12:2&3 CRLR 
277] 
The first such limitation resulted from 
the appellate court's decision to incorpo-
rate into California law certain evaluative 
criteria set out in the federal Freedom of 
Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. section 
552, which, like the Public Records Act, 
permits the withholding of records or in-
formation compiled for law enforcement 
purposes. In contrast to the Public Records 
Act, however, the FOIA permits withhold-
ing of these records only under six speci-
fied conditions. By incorporating the 
FOIA criteria into the Public Records Act, 
the appellate court in effect held that the 
sheriff's law enforcement records are not 
exempt from disclosure, despite the ex-
press exemption set out in section 6254(f), 
unless the sheriff could satisfy one or more 
of the FOIA criteria. 
The second nonstatutory limitation 
that the appellate court imposed on the 
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section 6254(f) exemption affects records 
which are not exempt from disclosure on 
their face but become exempt because of 
their inclusion in an investigatory file; the 
appellate court appeared to have held that 
such records remain exempt only so long 
as they continue to relate to a "pending" 
investigation. 
On appeal, the California Supreme 
Court clarified that the only two issues 
properly before it were the sheriff's objec-
tion to the appellate court's holding that 
the trial court must apply the FOIA criteria 
in deciding whether the criminal investi-
gation file must be produced under the 
Public Records Act, and the sheriff's ob-
jection to the court of appeal's holding that 
the exemption for investigatory files ter-
minates when the investigation termi-
nates. The court first addressed the appel-
late court's holding that section 6254(f) is 
limited by the FOIA criteria, and con-
cluded that the holding must be rejected as 
inconsistent with the language, history, 
and intent of the statute. The court ex-
plained that, without the FOIA criteria, 
section 6254(f) "articulates a broad ex-
emption from disclosure for law enforce-
ment investigatory records." A portion of 
the section which requires disclosure of 
certain information derived from the re-
cords about incidents, arrests, and com-
plaints does not, in most cases, entail dis-
closure of the records themselves. In con-
trast, section 6254(f), as the Fourth Dis-
trict interpreted it, would exempt investi-
gatory records only to the extent that dis-
closure of the information would trigger 
one of the six FOIA criteria. 
According to the Supreme Court, the 
most obvious and important objection to 
the Fourth District's interpretation of sec-
tion 6254(f) is that it finds no support in 
the statutory language. In drafting section 
6254(f), the legislature expressly imposed 
several precise limitations on the confi-
dentiality of law enforcement investiga-
tory records. The court commented that 
the legislature is capable of articulating 
additional limitations if that is what it in-
tends; further, the legislature has already 
enacted statutory provisions to address 
some of the concerns articulated in the 
FOIA criteria. In view of the legislature's 
painstaking efforts to articulate appropri-
ate limitations on the mandatory disclo-
sure of public records, the court found that 
the argument in favor of incorporating the 
FOIA criteria into the Public Records Act 
is "extremely weak." 
The court also stated that the legislature's 
careful efforts to provide access to selected 
information from law enforcement investi-
gatory records would be largely a waste of 
time if, as the court of appeal held, the 
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records themselves are subject to disclo-
sure when none of the FOIA criteria apply. 
The Supreme Court cautioned that a court 
should not lightly adopt an interpretation 
of statutory language that renders the lan-
guage useless in many of the cases it is 
intended to govern. Accordingly, the Su-
preme Court concluded that section 
6254(f) should not be interpreted to incor-
porate the FOIA criteria. 
The court then considered whether the 
exemption for law enforcement investiga-
tory files ends when the investigation 
ends; while the parties agreed that other-
wise nonexempt materials may become 
exempt through their inclusion in an in-
vestigatory file, they disagreed about the 
duration of that exemption. The newspa-
per argued that the exemption terminates 
when the investigation terminates. On the 
other hand, the sheriff asserted that the 
statute on its face contains no time limita-
tion and that the exemption serves inter-
ests that outlive the investigation for 
which the file was originally created, such 
as the safety of informants and undercover 
officers, the integrity of related investiga-
tions, and the privacy of persons whose 
affairs have been investigated but who 
have not been charged with crimes. 
In considering the scope of the exemp-
tion, the court reviewed the language of 
the statute, noting that nothing therein pur-
ports to place a time limit on the exemp-
tion for investigatory files. According to 
the court, if the legislature had wished to 
limit the exemption to files related to 
pending investigations, words to achieve 
that result are available; the court noted 
that it is not the province of courts "to 
insert what has been omitted." Therefore, 
the court held that, while there may be 
reasons of policy that would support a 
time limitation on the exemption for in-
vestigatory files, such a limitation is vir-
tually impossible to reconcile with the lan-
guage and history of section 6254(f). After 
an exhaustive review of state and federal 
caselaw on the matter, the court stated in 
a footnote that "the matter does appear to 
deserve legislative attention." 
Roberts v. Palmdale, et al., 
5 Cal. 4th 363, 93 D.A.R. 8030, 
No. S028100 (June 24, 1993). 
Legal Opinion Directed to 
Council Members Is Protected 
by Attorney-Client Privilege 
From Public Disclosure 
In this case, the California Supreme 
Court considered whether the California 
Public Records Act, Government Code 
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section 6250 et seq., requires public dis-
closure of a letter from the city attorney 
distributed to members of the city council, 
expressing the legal opinion of the city 
attorney regarding a matter pending be-
fore the council; whether the transmission 
of the written legal opinion at issue in this 
case was a "meeting" within the terms of 
the Ralph M. Brown Act, Government 
Code section 54950 et seq.; and whether a 
1987 amendment to the Brown Act in-
tended to abrogate the attorney-client 
privilege as it applies to the communica-
tion of written legal advice by a city attor-
ney to a city council. By way of back-
ground, the court explained that after the 
City of Palmdale's planning commission 
approved a parcel map application, appel-
lant Charmaine Roberts, a resident and 
taxpayer of the city affected by the pro-
posed development, appealed the matter 
to the Palmdale City Council. The city 
council took up the appeal at a public 
meeting. Appellant's attorney wrote an 
eight-page letter to the city council, ar-
guing that the approval of the parcel map 
was subject to legal challenge in several 
respects and concluding that, unless it re-
versed the approval of the parcel map, the 
city council was "a willing party to this 
flagrant effort to undermine its own laws 
and will be vulnerable to a court action to 
overturn its decision." 
The city council referred the letter to 
the city attorney and continued the hearing 
on the matter. The city attorney prepared 
a confidential written response that was 
distributed to the members of the city 
council. A public meeting ensued, at 
which the issues raised in the letter by 
appellant's counsel were discussed. At the 
hearing, appellant did not ask to see the 
letter from the city attorney to the city 
council, though the letter was referred to 
at that hearing. The city council denied the 
appeal and approved the map. Five days 
later, appellant's counsel demanded a 
copy of the city attorney's letter, arguing 
that the denial of the appeal and approval 
of the map were void if the city council 
had acted on the basis of secret communi-
cations. The city council refused to pro-
vide appellant with a copy of the letter 
from the city attorney. Appellant then pe-
titioned for administrative mandamus, 
seeking injunctive and declaratory relief 
to void the action of the city council and 
require the city council to make the dis-
puted letter public. The superior court de-
nied her petition, but the court of appeal 
reversed. [ 12 :4 CRLR 241 J 
The first question addressed by the Su-
preme Court is whether the city council 
may assert the attorney-client privilege as 
to the letter at issue in this case under the 
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Public Records Act, even though the letter 
did not relate to pending litigation. The 
court explained that the Public Records 
Act provides that "every person has a right 
to inspect any public record, except as 
hereafter provided." The Act then exempts 
certain records from disclosure; for exam-
ple, section 6254(k) exempts "[r]ecords 
the disclosure of which is exempted or 
prohibited pursuant to federal or state law, 
including, but not limited to, provisions of 
the Evidence Code relating to privilege." 
The court concluded that, by its reference 
to the privileges contained in the Evidence 
Code, the Public Records Act makes the 
attorney-client privilege applicable to 
public records. The court also explained 
that Evidence Code section 950 et seq. 
defines the attorney-client privilege, and 
found that the letter at issue in this case 
meets the definition of the term "confiden-
tial communication" as used in the Evi-
dence Code. Further, the court stated that 
"under the Evidence Code, the attorney-
client privilege applies to confidential 
communications within the scope of the 
attorney-client relationship even if the 
communication does not relate to pending 
litigation; the privilege applies not only to 
communications made in anticipation of 
litigation, but also to legal advice when no 
litigation is threatened." The court also 
rejected appellant's claim that Govern-
ment Code section 6254(b) limits the at-
torney-client privilege in the context of 
public records to matters that are actually 
in litigation, finding that section 6254(b) 
refers to litigation records generally, while 
section 6254(k) specifically refers to mat-
ters of privilege, including the attorney-
client privilege. 
Appellant next contended that under 
Government Code section 54956.9 (part 
of the Brown Act, which generally re-
quires local government bodies to deliber-
ate in public), any communication of any 
nature with counsel may only occur be-
tween a local governing body and its at-
torney as provided by the section, and 
since no litigation was pending or threat-
ened in this case, and no notice of a closed 
session was given, no closed session with 
counsel could be permitted. According to 
the court, the appellant assumed that the 
transmission of a legal opinion is a 
"closed-session meeting" or "closed ses-
sion" of the city council within the terms 
of section 54956.9. The court rejected this 
argument, finding that the terms "meet-
ing" and "session" "obviously imply col-
lective action ... and not...the passive re-
ceipt by individuals of their mail." 
Finally, the court addressed appellant's 
claim that recent amendments to the 
Brown Act require the abrogation of the 
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attorney-client privilege except to the ex-
tent specifically provided in Government 
Code section 54956. In dismissing this 
claim, the court explained that "the lan-
guage of section 54956.9 abrogates the 
attorney-client privilege for the purpose of 
the open meeting requirements of the 
Brown Act, except as provided by the 
section itself, but it does not purport to 
regulate the transmission of documents 
such as are at issue in this case. In fact, the 
section acknowledges that written matter 
sent from attorney to governmental client 
is regulated by the Public Records Act and 
not this section, by providing that the 
attorney's written memorandum of rea-
sons for requesting a closed session re-
quired by the section is 'exempt from dis-
closure pursuant to section 6254.1' of the 
Public Records Act" (emphasis original). 
CALIFORNIA COURTS 
OF APPEAL 
Funeral Security Plans, Inc. v. 
Board of Funeral Directors and 
Embalmers, 
16 Cal. App. 4th 1672, 93 D.A.R. 
8597, No. COl 1460 (July 1, 1993). 
Pending Litigation Exception to 
Open Meeting Act Protects 
Funeral Board's Investigation 
Before Initiation of Suit 
In this proceeding, Funeral Security 
Plans, Inc. (FSP) challenged the trial 
court's rejection of its allegations that the 
Board repeatedly violated the Bagley-
Keene Open Meeting Act, Government 
Code section 11 I 20 et seq.; the Board 
cross-appealed, seeking a reversal of the 
trial court's denial of its request for court 
costs and attorneys' fees. On March 25, 
the Third District Court of Appeal issued 
a opinion which affirms in part and re-
verses in part the trial court's decision. 
Following the court's decision, the Board 
filed a petition for rehearing; on April 26, 
the court granted the Board's motion. On 
July I, the Third District released a modi-
fied opinion which still affirms in part and 
reverses in part the trial court's decision; 
however, that opinion contained no sub-
stantial changes to the court's original de-
cision summarized in the last issue of the 
Reporter. { 13:2&3 CRLR 70-71, 225-26] 
Among other things, the Third District 
interpreted the scope of Government Code 
section 11126(q), the "pending litigation" 
exception to the public meeting require-
ment of the Bagley-Keene Open Meeting 
Act, and concluded that the presentation 
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of facts by legal counsel, deliberation, and 
decisionmaking are necessary compo-
nents of "conferring with" and "receiving 
advice from" legal counsel for purposes of 
the "pending litigation" exception to the 
Act. The court also held that the Board did 
not comply with the Act's requirement 
that "legal counsel of the state body shall 
prepare and submit to it a memorandum 
stating the specific reasons and legal au-
thority for the closed session" whenever 
the Board meets in private under the 
"pending litigation" exception. Third, the 
court interpreted Government Code sec-
tion 11126( d) to permit the Board to delib-
erate on an adjudicative matter in closed 
session only if evidence introduced in a 
public Administrative Procedure Act (APA) 
proceeding is being considered by the 
Board in rendering its decision. However, 
section l l l 26(d) does not allow the Board 
to go into closed session to receive new 
evidence and/or deliberate on petitions for 
termination of probation, reinstatement of 
a license, or reduction of a penalty not 
based on evidence introduced at a public 
administrative proceeding. Finally, the 
court held that the Board's two-member 
advisory committees are state bodies 
which must meet in public, pursuant to 
Government Code section 1112 I. 7. 
On behalf of the Board, the Attorney 
General's Office (AG) filed a petition for 
review with the California Supreme Court 
in early August. Among other things, the 
AG's petition disputes the Third District's 
finding that the Board's two-member ad-
visory committees are state bodies which 
must meet in public under the Bagley-
Keene Act and the court's interpretations 
of both Government Code section 
11126(d) and the scope of the "pending 
litigation" exception to the Act. At this 
writing, the Supreme Court has not issued 
a ruling on the Board's petition for review. 
Buhl, et al., v. Hannigan, et al., 
16 Cal. App. 4th 1612, 93 D.A.R. 
8501, No. G012245 (June 30, 
1993). 
Mandatory Motorcycle Helmet 
Law's Relationship to Public 
Safety Concerns Satisfies 
Constitutional Standards 
In this proceeding, the Fourth District 
Court of Appeal upheld the constitutional-
ity of California's Mandatory Motorcycle 
Helmet Law, Vehicle Code section 27802 
et seq., which requires motorcyclists and 
their passengers, when riding on the high-
ways, to wear helmets complying with 
section 27802, and makes it unlawful for 
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them to fail to do so. Among other things, 
the court held that the law is rationally 
related to a legitimate state concern; it is 
not impermissibly vague; it does not vio-
late the Americans with Disabilities Act 
(42 U.S.C. sections 12132-12213) or the 
Unruh Civil Rights Act (California Civil 
Code section 51 et seq.); and it does not 
impennissibly infringe on freedom of re-
ligion, freedom of expression, or the right 
of privacy. 
Dibb v. County of San Diego, 
et al., 
18 Cal. App. 4th 1520, 93 D.A.R. 
12221, No. D016569 (Sept. 24, 
1993). 
Board of Supervisors Can Create 
A Citizens' Review Panel With the 
Power to Subpoena Witnesses 
In 1990, the San Diego County Board of 
Supervisors proposed an amendment to the 
County Charter, adding section 606 requir-
ing the Board to create the Citizens Law 
Enforcement Review Board (CLERB); 
county voters approved the amendment in 
November 1990. Accordingly, the Board 
adopted section 606 which provides-
among other things-that CLERB 's duties 
include the review and investigation of citi-
zen complaints and any deaths of individuals 
arising out of or in connection with actions 
of peace officers, and that CLERB shall have 
the power to subpoena and require atten-
dance of witnesses and the production of 
books and papers pertinent to its investiga-
tions and to administer oaths. Pursuant to 
Code of Civil Procedure section 526a, plain-
tiff brought this action as a county taxpayer 
seeking to enjoin the County from spending 
funds in order to implement CLERB, ar-
guing that the County may not constitution-
ally grant CLERB the subpoena power. 
In considering whether a charter county 
may amend its charter to provide for the 
creation of a citizens' panel to review citizen 
complaints about the county sheriff's and 
probation departments and, more specific-
ally, grant to that panel the power to sub-
poena witnesses and evidence, the Fourth 
District Court of Appeal initially noted that 
Government Code section 25303 requires a 
county board of supervisors to "supervise 
the official conduct of all county offi-
cers ... and particularly insofar as the func-
tions and duties of such county officers ... re-
late to the assessing, collecting, safekeeping, 
management, or disbursement of public 
funds." Further, Government Code section 
31000.1 provides that the "board of supervi-
sors may appoint commissions or commit-
tees of citizens to study problems of general 
or special interest to the board and to make 
reports and recommendations to the 
board"; according to the court, "[c]learly 
CLERB is a citizens' commission which 
falls within this broad definition." 
After finding that the board created an 
authorized entity to study issues within the 
legitimate scope of the Board's responsi-
bilities, the court then considered whether 
the County charter may grant to this entity 
the power to subpoena witnesses and doc-
uments to assist in its investigations. The 
Fourth District noted that article 11, sec-
tion 4, of the California Constitution au-
thorizes charter counties to legislate on a 
variety of local topics and specifies that 
the county charter shall provide for the 
powers and duties of all county officers. 
Because CLERB members perform a pub-
lic function, are appointed to a fixed "term 
of office," and serve without compensa-
tion, the court found that they qualify as 
"county officers" within the meaning of 
section 4; accordingly, the County is au-
thorized to specify in the charter or by 
ordinance their powers. 
The court explained that the intent be-
hind section 4 is to extend to counties the 
option of "home rule"-the right of self-
government over local and county affairs. 
According to the court, "[u]tilization of 
the subpoena power is not in any sense 
inconsistent with the function of local 
government"; moreover, "as a practical 
matter, eliminating the subpoena power 
would frustrate CLERB's salutary pur-
poses ... because it is likely many peace 
officers and other critical witnesses would 
not appear voluntarily." The court there-
fore concluded that the provisions of the 
California Constitution which authorize 
"home rule" by charter counties permit 
such a county, in delineating the powers 
of county officers and employees, to con-
fer on a citizens; review board the author-
ity to subpoena witnesses and documents 
in furtherance of its investigations. 
CALIFORNIA SUPERIOR 
COURTS 
Planning and Conservation 
League v. Lungren, 
No. C-93 373836 (July 2, 1993). 
Court Invalidates Election Law 
Prohibiting Ballot Initiative 
Sponsors From Including Projects 
in the Initiative That Benefit Them 
Sacramento County Superior Court 
Judge James Ford has ruled that Elections 
Code section 5358, which provides that no 
California Regulatory Law Reporter• Vol. 13, No. 4 (Fall 19'. 
person shall include an appropriation for 
a particular project within the text of an 
initiative petition in exchange for a cam-
paign contribution or a pledge for a cam-
paign contribution for purposes of quali-
fying the petition for the ballot, violates 
the First Amendment and is therefore in-
valid. The Planning and Conservation 
League (PCL) brought this action in 
March after Attorney General Dan 
Lungren refused to process a PCL-backed 
initiative called the California Safe Drink-
ing Water and Fish and Wildlife Protection 
Act of 1994; according to Lungren, he 
refused to approve the initiative because 
the backers failed to sign a required affi-
davit indicating compliance with section 
5358. PCL contended that section 5358 
infringes on their rights to freedom of 
speech and association. 
Ford agreed with PCL, stating that sec-
tion 5358 "seems to be a severe infringe-
ment on the initiative process itself and 
has a chilling effect on the initiative pro-
cess and would prevent people from going 
forward and presenting legislation that 
they thought was perfectly suitable, good 
for the public weal, and beneficial to the 
people of the State of California as a 
whole." Ford further noted that "[i]t seems 
almost that the objection here really is a 
form of new political correctness in a way 
that no one must have a base motive to 
promote legislation in the initiative pro-
cess, that one must have a pure and sweet 
heart before one can be a proponent of 
legislation." 
The Attorney General is expected to 
appeal the decision; at this writing, how-
ever, no notice of appeal has been filed. 
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